




Conventional firewalls rely on the notions of restricted topology and controlled
entry points to function. More precisely, they rely on the assumption that every-
one on one side of the entry point—the firewall—is to be trusted, and that anyone
on the other side is, at least potentially, an enemy. The vastly expanded Internet
connectivity in recent years has called that assumption into question. We propose
a “distributed firewall”, using IPSEC, a policy language, and system management
tools. A distributed firewall preserves central control of access policy, while re-
ducing or eliminating any dependency on topology.
1 Introduction
Conventional firewalls [CB94] rely on the notions of restricted topology and control
entry points to function. More precisely, they rely on the assumption that everyone
on one side of the entry point—the firewall—is to be trusted, and that anyone on the
other side is, at least potentially, an enemy. The vastly expanded Internet connectivity
in recent years has called that assumption into question. So-called “extranets” can
allow outsiders to reach the “inside” of the firewall; on the other hand, telecommuters’
machines that use the Internet for connectivity need protection when encrypted tunnels
are not in place.
Other trends are also threatening firewalls. For example, some machines need more
access to the outside than do others. Conventional firewalls can do this, but only with
difficulty, especially as internal IP addresses change. End-to-end encryption is another
threat, since the firewall generally does not have the necessary keys to peek through the
encryption.
Some people have suggested that the proper approach is to discard the concept of
firewalls. Firewalls, they feel, are obsolete, or are not needed if cryptography is used.
We disagree.
Firewalls are still a powerful protective mechanism. Most security problems are
due to buggy code—in 1998, 9 of 13 CERT advisories concerned buffer overflows, and









Figure 1: A sample policy configuration file. SMTP from the outside can
only reach the machine with a certificate identifying it as the mail gate-
way; it, in turn, can speak SMTP to all inside machines. NTP—a low-risk
protocol that has its own application-level protection—can be distributed
from a given IP address to all inside machines. Finally, all outgoing calls
are permitted.
two of the rest were cryptographic bugs—and cannot be prevented by encryption or
authentication. A firewall shields most such applications from hostile connections.
Firewalls are also useful at protecting legacy applications. While applications that
require strong authentication should provide their own, there are too many older proto-
cols and implementations that do not. Saying that strong cryptography should be used
is true but irrelevant; in the context of such applications, it is simply unavailable.
More subtly, firewalls are a mechanism for policy control. That is, they permit a
site’s administrator to set a policy on external access. Just as file permissions enforce
an internal security policy, a firewall can enforce an external security policy.
To solve these problems while still retaining the advantages of firewalls, we propose
a distributed solution. In such a scheme, policy is still centrally defined; enforcement,
however, takes place on each endpoint. We thus retain the advantages of firewalls
while avoiding most of the problems we have described, most notably the dependency
on topology.
Distributed firewalls rest on three notions: (a) a policy language that states what sort
of connections are permitted or prohibited, (b) any of a number of system management
tools, such as Microsoft’s SMS or ASD [Koe84], and (c) IPSEC [KA98], the network-
level encryption mechanism for TCP/IP.
The basic idea is simple. A compiler translates the policy language into some
internal format. The system management software distributes this policy file to all
hosts that are protected by the firewall. And incoming packets are accepted or rejected
by each “inside” host, according to both the policy and the cryptographically-verified
identity of each sender.
2 Policies and Identifiers
Many possible policy languages can be used, including file-oriented schemes similar to
Firmato [BMNW99], the GUIs that are found on most modern commercial firewalls,
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and general policy languages such as KeyNote [BFK99, BFIK99]. The exact nature is
not crucial, though clearly the language must be powerful enough to express the desired
policy. A sample is shown in Figure 1.
What is important is how the inside hosts are identified. Today’s firewalls rely on
topology; thus, network interfaces are designated “inside”, “outside”, “DMZ”, etc. We
abandon this notion (but see Section 5), since distributed firewalls are independent of
topology.
A second common host designator is IP address. That is, a specified IP address
may be fully trusted, able to receive incoming mail from the Internet, etc. Distributed
firewalls can use IP addresses for host identification, though with a reduced level of
security.
Our preferred identifier is the name in the cryptographic certificate used with IPSEC.
Certificates can be a very reliable unique identifier. They are independent of topology;
furthermore, ownership of a certificate is not easily spoofed. If a machine is granted
certain privileges based on its certificate, those privileges can apply regardless of where
the machine is located physically.
In a different sense, policies can be “pulled” dynamically by the end system. For
example, a license server or a security clearance server can be asked if a certain com-
munication should be permitted. A conventional firewall could do the same, but it lacks
important knowledge about the context of the request. End systems may know things
like which files are involved, and what their security levels might be. Such information
could be carried over a network protocol, but only by adding complexity.
3 Distributed Firewalls
In a typical organizational environment, individuals are not necessarily the adminis-
trators of the computers they use. Instead, to simplify system administration and to
permit some level of central control, a system management package is used to admin-
ister individual machines. Patches can be installed, new software distributed, etc. We
use the same mechanisms, which are likely present in any event, to control a distributed
firewall.
Policy is enforced by each individual host that participates in a distributed fire-
wall. The security administrator—who is no longer necessarily the “local” adminis-
trator, since we are no longer constrained by by topology—defines the security policy
in terms of host identifiers. The resulting policy (probably, though not necessarily,
compiled to some convenient internal format) is then shipped out, much like any other
change. This policy file is consulted before processing incoming or outgoing messages,
to verify their compliance. It is most natural to think of this happening at the network
or transport layers, but policies and enforcement can equally well apply to the applica-
tion layer. For example, some sites might wish to force local Web browsers to disable
Java or Javascript.
Policy enforcement is especially useful if the peer host is identified by a certificate.
If so, the local host has a much stronger assurance of its identity than in a traditional
firewall. In the latter case, all hosts on the inside are in some sense equal. If any such
machines are subverted, they can launch attacks on hosts that they would not normally
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talk to, possibly by impersonating trusted hosts for protocols such as rlogin. With
a distributed firewall, though, such spoofing is not possible; each host’s identity is
cryptographically assured.
This is most easily understood by contrasting it to traditional packet filters [Mog89].
Consider the problem of electronic mail. Because of a long-standing history of security
problems in mailers, most sites with firewalls let only a few, designated hosts receive
mail from the outside. They in turn will relay the mail to internal mail servers. Tradi-
tional firewalls would express this by a rule that permitted SMTP (port 25) connections
to the internal mail gateways; access to other internal hosts would be blocked. On the
inside of the firewall, though, access to port 25 is unrestricted.
With a distributed firewall, all machines have some rule concerning port 25. The
mail gateway permits anyone to connect to that port; other internal machines, however,
permit contact only from the mail gateway, as identified by its certificate. Note how
much stronger this protection is: even a subverted internal host cannot exploit possible
mailer bugs on the protected machines.
Distributed firewalls have other advantages as well. The most obvious is that there
is no longer a single chokepoint. From both a performance and an availability stand-
point, this is a major benefit. Throughput is no longer limited by the speed of the
firewall; similarly, there is no longer a single point of failure that can isolate an entire
network. Some sites attempt to solve these problems by using multiple firewalls; in
many cases, though, that redundancy is purchased only at the expense of an elaborate
(and possibly insecure) firewall-to-firewall protocol.
A second advantage is more subtle. Today’s firewalls don’t have certain knowledge
of what a host intends. Instead, they have to rely on externally-visible features of
assorted protocols. Thus, an incoming TCP packet is sometimes presumed legitimate
if it has the “ACK” bit set, since such a packet can only be legitimate if it is part of an
ongoing conversation—a conversation whose initiation was presumably allowed by the
firewall. But spoofed ACK packets can be used as part of “stealth scanning”. Similarly,
it is hard for firewalls to treat UDP packets properly, because they cannot tell if they
are replies to outbound queries, and hence legal, or if they are incoming attacks. The
sending host, however, knows. Relying on the host to make the appropriate decision is
therefore more secure.
This advantage is even clearer when it comes to protocols such as FTP [PR85]. By
default, FTP clients use the PORT command to specify the port number used for the
data channel; this port is for an incoming call that should be permitted, an operation
that is generally not permitted through a firewall. Today’s firewalls—even the stateful
packet filters—generally use an application-level gateway to handle such commands.
With a distributed firewall, the host itself knows when it is listening for a particular
data connection, and can reject random probes.
The most important advantage, though, is that distributed firewalls can protect hosts
that are not within a topological boundary. Consider a telecommuter who uses the In-
ternet both generically and to tunnel in to a corporate net. How should this machine
be protected? A conventional approach can protect the machine while tunneled. But
that requires that generic Internet use be tunneled into the corporate network and then
back out the Internet. Apart from efficiency considerations, such use is often in vio-
lation of corporate guidelines. Furthermore, there is no protection whatsoever when
4
the tunnel is not set up. By contrast, a distributed firewall protects the machine all of
the time, regardless of whether or not a tunnel is set up. Corporate packets, authenti-
cated by IPSEC, are granted more privileges; packets from random Internet hosts can
be rejected. And no triangle routing is needed.
4 Hybrid Firewalls
4.1 Remote Nodes and IPSEC
Although a full implementation of distributed firewalls is the most secure and the most
flexible, hybrid implementations can exist. That is, one can combine the techniques
described here with traditional firewalls, achieving adequate functionality at lower cost,
especially until IPSEC support becomes ubiquitous.
In a hybrid implementation, some hosts are behind a traditional firewall, while other
hosts live on the outside. An IPSEC gateway at the central site provides connectivity to
the outside machines. (Whether this gateway is inside the traditional firewall, outside
it, in parallel with it, or even integrated with it is largely irrelevant to this discussion.)
This configuration is common at companies with a major central site and some number
of telecommuters.
As in ordinary virtual private networks (VPNs), remote hosts have full access to
the inside, by virtue of the IPSEC tunnel. Traffic from inside machines to the remote
nodes is similarly protected. What is distinct is that traffic from remote nodes to the
rest of the Internet is governed by the central site’s security policy. That is, the firewall
administrator distributes a security policy to the remote nodes, as we have described.
Ideally, of course, this same policy statement is used to control the traditional firewall,
thus ensuring a consistent security policy.
4.2 Distributed Firewalls and Topological Knowledge
Another variety of hybrid implementation ignores IPSEC entirely. In this situation,
address-dependent policy rules are distributed to, and enforced by, every individual
host within a site. (Many newer systems support such functionality in the kernel.)
While address-based authentication is quite weak, if a simple router prevents address-
spoofing from the outside the security should comparable to that of traditional firewalls.
Here, we use system management techniques to ensure consistent policy. We also
rely on topology, thus forfeiting the ability to protect remote hosts. However, we still
eliminate the single chokepoint and point of failure.
A final hybrid scheme combines the two previous hybrid schemes. Again, a simple
router prevents address-spoofing by outside machines that talk to inside nodes. IPSEC
is used to tunnel traffic from inside notes to remote nodes. On these systems, the IPSEC
module provides anti-spoofing protection. Finally, all protected machines, whether
local or remote, receive and enforce an address-based firewall policy.
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4.3 Application-specific Tunnels
With the proper sort of routing, triangle routing can be used for a few protocols, while
distributed firewall techniques are used for most. Suppose, for example, that some
protocol requires an application-level proxy for proper firewalling. Packets for that
protocol can be routed through an IPSEC-protected tunnel to the inside of the firewall.
From there, they can be forwarded to the Internet, but only after proper processing by
the firewall.
In the extreme case, of course, this reduces to a conventional firewall. But if few
enough protocols need this sort of filtering, it becomes an attractive variant.
5 Implementation Techniques
A number of different techniques can be used to to implement distributed firewalls. The
strongest is to use end-to-end IPSEC. Each incoming packet can be associated with a
certificate; the access granted to that packet is determined by the rights granted to
that certificate. Consider a packet destined for port 25 (SMTP) on an inside machine,
given the sample policy shown in Figure 1. If the certificate identifies the source as
mailgw.example.com—note that this is not necessarily the same as the machine
with that domain name—the packet will be accepted. If the certificate name is different
(for clarity, we omit any discussion of the certificate’s signature chain, though that is
clearly important for real use), or if there is no IPSEC protection, the packet will be
dropped as unauthorized.
We note that the necessary filtering is prescribed by the IPSEC architecture [KA98].
Specifically, the inbound Security Policy Database (SPD) is used to reject illegal input
packets, while the outbound SPD can be used to control outgoing connections. An
informal survey showed that most commercial IPSEC implementations either support
port number-granularity security associations or will in the near future.
Application-level protection can be achieved by distributing application-specific
policy files. Thus, web browsers can be told, by the central site, to reject, for example,
all ActiveX controls or Java applets. Note that this is a hard problem for conventional
firewalls [MRR97]; doing it on the end hosts is more secure, if the policy distribution
problem can be solved.
The hardest problem is handling protocols such as FTP without touching the ap-
plication. That is done most easily with per-process keying for IPSEC. For example,
a policy rule for FTP would indicate that outbound connections to port 21 must be
protected with IPSEC, and that all other TCP connections protected by that security
association are legal. Since only that process can use that SA, and it would only have
the FTP data channel open, an adequate level of protection can be achieved.
KeyNote is an especially attractive choice for a policy language. Indeed, Blaze,
Ioannidis, and Keromytis [BFK99, BFIK99] explicitly note its suitability for config-
uring packet filters. Its advantages include the integration of credentials with policy
specification, and an ability to use a single mechanism to specify policy at different
levels.
In some sense, distributed firewalls are similar to host-based enforcement as imple-
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Figure 2: A policy configuration file with version information.
mented in TCP wrappers [Ven92], a similar package for restricting access to assorted
daemons [LeF92], or various commercial PC “personal firewall” packages. There is
indeed some similarity. However, those schemes are still dependent on IP addresses
(and hence topology), and do not include central policy definition as an integral piece.
6 Change Management
Given that access rights in a strong distributed firewall are tied to certificates, access
rights can be limited by changing the set of certificates accepted. Suppose, for example,
that a security flaw is discovered in some networked application. A new certificate can
be distributed to hosts in the same distribution as the patch. Only hosts with newer
certificates are then considered to be “inside”; if the change is not installed, the machine
will have fewer privileges (Figure 2).
In some environments, it may even be possible to use certificates to help ensure
user compliance. A PolicyMaker certificate [BFL96, BFS98] could contain code that
checked the configuration of the user’s system. If the check failed—that is, if the
proper versions of the proper files were not present—the certificate would not allow
itself to be used for authentication. (Clearly, without tamper-resistant hardware this is
not an absolute check. But it can help protect against accidental misconfiguration and
less-determined malfeasance.)
The certificate version mechanism also protects against new, insecure machines
that are installed on an inside network. Until the appropriate filtering software and
rulesets are installed (and possibly until the machine is otherwise made secure by the
organization’s administrators), no certificate is issued. The machine is thus an outside
machine, regardless of its physical location.
7 Threat Comparison
Distributed firewalls have both strengths and weaknesses when compared to conven-
tional firewalls. By far the biggest difference, of course, is their reliance on topology.
If your topology does not permit reliance on traditional firewall techniques, there is
little choice. A more interesting question is how the two types compare in a closed,
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single-entry network. That is, if either will work, is there a reason to choose one over
the other?
7.1 Service Exposure and Port Scanning
Both types of firewalls are excellent at rejecting connection requests for inappropriate
services. Conventional firewalls drop the requests at the border; distributed firewalls
do so at the host. A more interesting question is what is noticed by the host attempting
to connect. Today, such packets are typically discarded, with no notification. A dis-
tributed firewall may choose to discard the packet, under the assumption that its legal
peers know to use IPSEC; alternatively, it may instead send back a response requesting
that the connection be authenticated, which in turn gives notice of the existence of the
host.
Firewalls built on pure packet filters cannot reject some “stealth scans” very well.
One technique, for example, uses fragmented packets that can pass through unexam-
ined because the port numbers aren’t present in the first fragment. A distributed firewall
will reassemble the packet and then reject it.
On balance, against this sort of threat the two firewall types are at least comparable.
7.2 Application-level Proxies
Some services require an application-level proxy. Conventional firewalls often have an
edge here; the filtering code is complex and not generally available on host platforms.
As noted, a hybrid technique can often be used to overcome this disadvantage.
In some cases, of course, application-level controls can avoid the problem entirely.
If the security administrator can configure all Web browsers to reject ActiveX, there is
no need to filter incoming HTML via a proxy.
In other cases, a suitably sophisticated IPSEC implementation will suffice. For ex-
ample, there may be no need to use a proxy that scans outbound FTP control messages
for PORT commands, if the kernel will permit an application that has opened an out-
bound connection to receive inbound connections. This is more or less what such a
proxy would do.
7.3 Denial of Service Attacks
It is impossible to lump all denial of service attacks into one basket. However, some
statements can be made about particular known attacks.
The “smurf” attack (CERT Advisory CA-98.01, 5 January 1998) primarily con-
sumes the bandwidth on the access line from an ISP to the target site. Neither form
of firewall offers an effective defense. If one is willing to change the topology, both
can be moderately effective. Conventional firewalls can be located at the ISP’s POP,
thus blocking the attack before it reaches the low-bandwidth access line. Distributed
firewalls permit hosts to be connected via many different access lines, thus finessing
the problem. For now, a distributed intrusion detection systems would be useful.
It may be possible to chew up CPU time by bombarding the IKE process with bogus
security association negotiation requests. While this can affect conventional firewalls,
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inside machines would still be able to communicate. Distributed firewalls rely much
more on IKE, and hence are more susceptible. It is an open question if a different key
exchange protocol will be needed to resist such attacks.
Conversely, any attack that consumes resources on conventional firewalls, such as
many email attachments that must be scanned for viruses, can bog down such firewalls
and affect all users. For that matter, too much legitimate traffic can overload a firewall.
As noted, distributed firewalls do not suffer from this effect.
7.4 Intrusion Detection
Many firewalls detect attempted intrusions. If that functionality is to be provided by
a distributed firewall, each individual host has to notice probes and forward them to
some central location for processing and correlation.
The former problem is not hard; many hosts already log such attempts. One can
make a good case that such detection should be done in any event. Collection is more
problematic, especially at times of poor connectivity to the central site. There is also
the risk of co-ordinated attacks in effect causing a denial of service attack against the
central machine.
Our tentative conclusion is that intrusion detection is somewhat harder than with
conventional firewalls. While more information can be gathered, using the same tech-
niques on hosts protected by conventional firewalls would gather the same sort of data.
7.5 Insider Attacks
At first glance, the biggest weakness of distributed firewalls is their greater susceptibil-
ity to lack of cooperation by users. What happens if someone changes the policy files
on their own?
Although there are technical measures that can be taken, as discussed earlier, these
are limited in their ability to cope with serious misbehavior. That said, we assert that
this problem is not a real differentiator. Even conventional firewalls are easily subverted
by an uncooperative insider. SSH [Ylo96] can be used to tunnel TCP ports, external
Web proxies such as www.anonymizer.com can bypass destination restrictions,
end-to-end encryption can hide traffic, etc. In other words, an insider who wishes to
violate firewall policy can do so, with either type of firewall. As Marcus Ranum put it,
“You can’t solve social problems with software.”
On the other hand, distributed firewalls can reduce the threat of actual attacks by
insiders, simply by making it easier to set up smaller groups of users. Thus, one can
restrict access to a file server to only those users who need it, rather than letting anyone
inside the company pound on it.
It is also worth expending some effort to prevent casual subversion of policies. If
policies are stored in a simple ASCII file, a user wishing to, for example, play a game
could easily turn off protection. Requiring the would-be uncooperative user to go to
more trouble is probably worthwhile, even if the mechanism is theoretically insuffi-
cient. For example, policies could be digitally signed, and verified by a frequently-
changing key in an awkward-to-replace location. For more stringent protections, the
policy enforcement can be incorporated into a tamper-resistant network card.
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A more serious issue concerns inadvertent errors when using application-level poli-
cies. An administrator might distribute configuration restrictions for Netscape Naviga-
tor or Microsoft’s Internet Explorer. But what would happen if a user, in all innocence,
were to install the Opera browser? The only real solution here is a standardized way to
express application-level policies across all applications of a given type. We do not see
that happening any time soon.
8 Conclusions
Firewalls are sometimes described as incompatible with the modern network environ-
ment. Furthermore, there are conflicts between a strong security technology—end-to-
end IPSEC—and firewalls, since the firewall can no longer examine the traffic. We
have shown that the two are actually synergistic: IPSEC can be used to implement
stronger firewalls, while eliminating many of the limitations of today’s firewalls. We
retain protection and centralized policy control; we eliminate dependency on topology,
IP addresses, and the conflict with IPSEC.
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